Human Events *A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen*

Editorial Office 1323 M STREET, WASHINGTON 5, D.C. *Telephone* NATIONAL 2066

VOL. III, NO. 13, *Issue Number* 113 MARCH 27, 1946 ★ *Editors:* FELIX MORLEY & FRANK C. HANIGHEN

HOW TO ELECT A DICTATOR

By Felix Morley

With the careful count of votes virtually complete, it is now admitted that Col. Juan Perón won a sweeping victory in the Argentine presidential election of February 24. No responsible witness has even asserted that this election, giving Perón the largest majority received by any Argentine President since the establishment of the electoral college in 1916, was anything other than an honest and admirably conducted expression of the popular will.

Not yet admitted, but impossible to conceal, is the fact that Col. Perón's triumph constitutes one of the most serious setbacks ever experienced by the diplomacy of the United States. Faith in the direction of the Department of State is further shaken by the boomerang of its strenuous effort to discredit the man now chosen by the people of Argentina to lead them for the next six years.

Diplomatic ineptitude is also apparent in the uncertain handling of relations with the Spanish Government. On March 4, the Department of State made public official translations of 15 documents, seized in Italy and Germany, to demonstrate collaboration of the Spanish Dictator with the Axis Powers. Simultaneously, in concert with Great Britain and France, the Truman Administration urged the Spanish people to oust the Caudillo. But one week later, in response to a French request that this issue be put on the agenda of the current UNO Council, we blew cold. In the words of our note to France:

> "On the basis of its present analysis of all the facts in its possession concerning the Spanish situation . . . the Government of the United States does not believe that a situation exists, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

Unquestionably, the failure of the official effort to defeat Perón, by denouncing him as an Axis collaborator, has led to the adoption of a less raucous tone in talking to Franco. But this does not undo the harm that has been done. On the contrary it reveals

Copyright 1946 by HUMAN EVENTS, Inc.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our diplomacy, in Spain as in Argentina, as ineffective and unintelligent bluff.

II

These diplomatic failures, with their dangerous effect in strengthening dictatorships, trace directly to abandonment of the historic policy of non-intervention. Under this policy, appropriate for a government created by revolution, it was for generations the practice of the United States to grant recognition on the basis of the stability rather than the morality of a foreign régime. Recognition of Czarist Russia, for instance, did not imply approval of serfdom and political exile to Siberia, any more than recognition of Communist Russia implies approval of similar practices there today.

As John Bassett Moore described non-intervention, in his authoritative study of Principles of American Diplomacy (1918):

> "This term was used inclusively in a two-fold sense. It expressed, in the first place, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In this sense, while betokening the revolutionary origin of the government . . . it was also intended reciprocally to concede to other nations the right to determine their form of government and otherwise to manage their domestic concerns, each for itself and in its own way. In the second place, it embraced non-participation in the political arrangements between other governments, and above all strict abstention from any part in the political arrangements of Europe."

It is of course logical that the original doctrine of non-intervention should be superseded as a policy of inter-governmental collaboration replaces one of isolationism. But as it is only this collaboration which justifies the change, so the new practice of intervention must be joint rather than individual. To replace non-intervention with unilateral intervention is to replace isolationism with imperialism in its most aggressive form; and few Americans would regard such a development as anything but a change for the worse in foreign policy.

Yet it is precisely that intervention on our individual say-so which we have tried to make effective in Argentina, even though at San Francisco we sponsored the Argentine Government as a Member of the United Nations and therefore accepted a legal as well as a moral obligation not to act alone against it. We forget how this looks to impartial eyes. We forget that a government, like an individual, cannot properly indorse a principle as applicable to others unless willing to have that same principle applied to itself.

If the United States is justified in trying to overthrow any government which this

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Administration likes to label Fascist, then Soviet Russia is equally justified in trying to undermine any government which Premier Stalin likes to label Capitalist.

III

The complete failure of our attempted intervention in Argentina will not, of course, restore the diplomatic status quo ante. We have charged Perón with seeking to develop anti-American sentiment in Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil. There is no reason why he should cease such efforts, nor why they should be any less successful, now that he is about to become the duly-elected President of Argentina.

On the contrary, Perón's electoral triumph after our frantic effort to defeat him is all too likely to encourage the very developments we have been seeking to avert. In the United States there will be little press or radio comment on the humiliating flop of our Latin-American diplomacy. But the people of the Latin-American countries are not so ill-informed on this issue. They fully realize that the Rio de Janeiro Conference, planned to write the wartime Act of Chapultepec into a permanent inter-American mutual security treaty, has now for the second time been postponed at State Department request.

Pan-American unity has been a cardinal point in American foreign policy ever since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. But never before has friendship between North and South America been more strained than is the case today. The "Good Neighbor" policy, which was the one great diplomatic achievement of the early years of the Roosevelt Administration, has been virtually liquidated in a single year of Mr. Truman's presidency. And Cordell Hull has every right to feel bitter if he recalls his ringing assurances to Latin-America at the Montevideo Conference of December, 1933: " . . . no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration."

That may be compared with a recent equivocal statement by Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs in the Department of State, in a radio broadcast well titled, "What Is Our Inter-American Policy?" Said Mr. Briggs:

> "What we're really trying to say is that the doctrine of non-intervention means no intervention by any <u>one</u> nation. It's my own belief that the necessity for intervention by the use of force would rarely occur. You wouldn't have to go this far in a majority of cases. The airing of the facts should in itself do much to correct the condition."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

It is said, as a partial airing of the facts, that collaborationist wartime dealings with the Axis Powers, on the part of Franco and Perón, justified American diplomatic pressure to oust their Governments. Certainly the documentary evidence seized in Germany and recently made public by the Department of State is unsavory, especially if we forget that Spain was under Hitler's guns and that if Argentina was to obtain any implements of war to balance those we provided Brazil, they had to come from the Axis Powers.

But the Department of State has been highly selective in publishing diplomatic material obtained from German sources. Nothing, for instance, has been made public on the last negotiations between Molotov and von Ribbentrop preceding the Nazi attack on Russia.

It is known that the official German records of these negotiations are now in the possession of the Department of State. It is also known that this material is sensational both in its revelations of as yet unachieved Russian territorial ambitions and in its demonstration of Stalin's willingness to continue cooperation with Hitler, provided only that the permanent arrangements were sufficiently advantageous to the Kremlin.

If the diplomacy of a democracy is to be successful, the Administration must be honest with the electorate. It cannot establish confidence by sensationalizing such secret documents as react disadvantageously to some foreign governments, while carefully concealing from public knowledge material which would tend to arouse criticism of other governments.

For some unexplained reason the Truman Administration has elected to be very tough with totalitarian practice in the weak Catholic nations of Spain and Argentina, very tender with totalitarian practice on the part of Communist Russia. In so doing it has completely ignored George Washington's wise warning that:

> "The Nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is . . . a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."

And the election of Perón shows that our recent opportunistic diplomacy has not even the merit of temporary success to offset its sacrifice of principles and tradition.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Reproduction or quotation is permitted only when credit is given to HUMAN EVENTS. Trial subscription, six weeks for $1.00. Six months, $5.50. One year, $10.00. Two years, $18.00. Foreign and airmail rates on request. Please remit in U.S.A. DOLLARS.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. III - No. 13

By Frank C. Hanighen March 27, 1946

The key to the tangled situation at the Security Council conference in New York lies in the little recognized fact that there are two UNO organizations and not one, whole and indivisible. This is brought out sharply by the Iranian problem, the first and most crucial to be thrown into the lap of the New York meeting. The Western UNO is struggling to prevent the body and soul of Iran from coming into the possession of Stalin's UNO.

A little noticed passage of Stalin's election broadcast on February 12 throws a revealing light on the fact that it's not one world but two -- or perhaps more -- and not one UNO but two. "The point now is", emphasized Marshal Stalin, "that the Soviet state system has proved an example of a multi-national state system where the national problem and the problem of collaboration among nations are solved better than in any other multi-national state." Was Stalin saying that the expanding Soviet empire is a multi-national system and offers a better future than the only other multi-national system, namely UNO? Stalin is not interested in the Western UNO, save as a means of maintaining friendly relations with the United States as Harry Hopkins more than once observed, and as a check on its possible anti-Soviet activities.

If one reads events in this light, it becomes clear why Stalin, on March 22, told the Associated Press of his esteem for the Western UNO -- an amicable gesture toward Washington. And it also becomes clear why he seems intent on getting the border state of Iran into his multi-national system. The struggle over whether Iran becomes exclusively a member of our UNO or of Stalin's will test the Soviet ruler's ability to reconcile friendship for the United States with the interests of his own multi-national organization.

Some such conciliatory effort was evident last week, not only from Stalin's polite words to the AP but from the fact that Moscow announced the retention of Maxim Litvinov as one of four Deputy Foreign Ministers under Molotov. Litvinov, symbol of amity with the West, is now brought to the fore again, after a period of obscurity. But nothing that Stalin has said or done as yet proves conclusively that he has retreated in regard to Iran. Gromyko's position at the Council session Tuesday demonstrated this.

Thus one assertion that Russia was evacuating Iran turned out to be false because the Iranian places mentioned had been reported as evacuated in February. Another story intimated that Russia was withdrawing its troops from Eastern Europe; but actually it merely gave the number withdrawn since V-E Day. Those remaining outnumber all the Western troops. Finally, press reports of Capitol Hill reaction to Stalin's nice word about UNO gave a fictitiously authoritative aura of optimism. The fact is that most Senators decline to comment, not really knowing anything about the subject; those who do comment are no better informed. Readers should be cautious about such reactions to "spot news".

Stalin may have been impressed by the marshalling of world opinion against his policy in Iran. But it is likely that he was more impressed by certain signs of military earnestness on the part of the United States. Diplomats arriving from Europe to attend the UNO Council sessions in New York report that American troops in Austria and Venezia Giulia have been put on the "alert". In both areas there are envenomed disputes between East and West. In the latter area, Tito's nine divisions face a force of one American and one British division. "Alert" to Stalin signifies more than any allocution from Mr. Byrnes.

Meanwhile, the British skeptically study the latest phase in Stalin's war of nerves; unlike the Americans who leap from black despair to exuberant optimism when Stalin says a nice word about UNO. "A peaceful Persia, a stable Persia, a friendly

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Copyright 1946 by HUMAN EVENTS, Inc.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Persia, an independent Persia have been the cornerstones of British policy", said Curzon in 1920. In 1946, the British know that unless that foundation endures they have lost the rubber.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

When Secretary Henry A. Wallace implored the Democratic Party to purge Democrats in Congress who fail to vote for the Administration's liberal program, his proposal sounded like one of the odd but sincere vagaries of an all too familiar character. Capitol Hill treated it as unworthy of serious consideration, but diagnosed it as a rather frantic attempt to cater to Left Wing sentiment, which has recently been chilly towards Mr. Truman. The President may talk like a New Republic editorial to the legislators, but he doesn't "turn on the heat" and translate his recommendations into bills which draw a majority. On the contrary, the Left seemed to appreciate Mr. Ickes' peevish suggestion that even a Republican, if he met Mr. Ickes' definition of liberalism, should get Leftist votes at next fall's elections. This was the background inspiring the Wallace attempt to come to the aid of the Party.

The results have not been noticeably happy. CIO leaders continue to compare Mr. Truman unfavorably with Mr. Chester Bowles. And the reaction of the Right Wing was virtually apoplectic, reinforcing that element's determination to fight till death.

Meanwhile, Senator Claude Pepper's enthusiasm for Russia and biting attacks on British and American foreign policy are attributed to other than selfless motives. The Floridan, it is said, could hardly have expected to persuade any of his colleagues of the purity of Stalin's intentions by his wild harangue of March 21. It was, as could have been expected, received badly by the Senators and drew a scathing reply from Senator Ball. No, say observers, Pepper is also bidding for Left Wing support, but not for the Party's sake. It is noticed that he is not often on the floor, nor toiling in committee, but deserts Washington frequently on trips to New York and elsewhere. This is an infallible sign of fence-building. Also, he is in a better position to play politics than Henry Wallace, who as a Cabinet officer enjoys less freedom of speech and maneuver. In short, some of his colleagues conclude that "Claude is out to displace Henry as the Left Wing favorite for the Presidential nomination in 1948."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Britain is now proceeding seriously in an effort to grant independence to India, say officials (American) usually skeptical of British professions about India. Accustomed to looking for "jokers", they can find none in Prime Minister Attlee's offer of March 15. Indeed, they find a sharp reversal of the British "divide and rule" policy. Last summer the British treated the Moslem Party on a par with the Congress Party, which commands a majority. Today, the British have seemingly swung to the side of Congress, offering to transfer power to a unified central government which can summon a majority. The shrill protests of the Moslem League and the benign, or at least much less suspicious, attitude of the Congress Party are significant reactions.

Abandonment of the British Raj in India would be of no less importance to the British Empire and the world than the successful revolt of the American colonies in the Eighteenth Century. Among the forces prompting London to envisage such an abdication, Attlee mentioned one -- the "total" character of nationalist ferment, which now includes both lower and upper classes. Another is the dangerous unrest in the Indian Army. Finally, there looms the famine which may bring India literally to the boiling-over stage. British leaders apparently feel that Britain has not the strength militarily and economically to stem this strong tide. Nehru recognized this when he said, on March 20, "Possession of India is gradually ceasing to be a profit in any way. It is becoming a burden." Better to free India, it seems, and thereby hope to keep it in the British Commonwealth of Nations. But success is not assured until the thorny Moslem issue is solved.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A change in the Communist Party line on Argentina is under way. A new story, "Argentines Eye Favorably Stronger Soviet Trade Ties" in the Daily Worker on March 22 contains not one word of criticism of the Perón régime, emphasizes the fact that "Argentina is a sovereign country" and dwells on closer Soviet-Argentine commercial advantages. A Russian trade delegation is expected in Buenos Aires. The next step, after a trade pact, would conceivably be diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by Argentina.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

International law appears to be clearly on the side of the Swiss whose representatives are now carrying on negotiations in Washington with the U. S. Government. The United States is trying to take possession of all German assets in that neutral country. The Swiss position, which has received little space in our newspapers, was set forth clearly in an article in the Tribune de Genève, November 30, 1945. This article claims that German funds which entered Switzerland up to 1933 (when Hitler took power) are bona fide German property and cannot be touched. Funds entering Switzerland between 1933 and 1939, when German currency controls were stringent, should be presumed innocent, being refugee money, etc. The Swiss admit that funds imported after 1939, and especially after 1940, are suspect. Although the war has been over for almost a year, the U. S. Government still has 600 Swiss firms on its blacklist, and the Treasury Department is still blocking $1,500,000,000 of Swiss assets in this country.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On March 12, the Communist Party held a secret meeting in a Middle Western city. We have received a report on what took place at that gathering from one of those present. It will be no surprise to learn that party organizers were exhorted by their leaders to attack the Churchill speech given at Fulton, Missouri, and to defend Russia's foreign policy. But they were also told to criticize the Arctic defense preparations of Canada and the United States; and to assail our policy of "atomic secrecy". The atomic problem, as a matter of fact, occupied no little attention. The leaders stressed the large number of industries involved in making the atomic bomb in this country and the necessity of slowing up by strikes and sabotage the manufacture of all possible parts of atomic bombs. It occurs to us that a study of strikes present and future and the plants in which they occur might yield a very interesting pattern.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

While certain sections of the press never cease to attack the Hoover mission on the ground that Mr. Hoover used food as a political weapon after the last war, testimony as to Soviet use of food for this purpose increases. From a reliable source we learn that recently Russia offered grain to the Greek Government on condition that Soviet Russia be given a base on the Dodecanese Islands. The Greeks refused.

New light is thrown on the Russian offer to send 500,000 tons of grain to France at the instance of Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader. The Russians were obviously exploiting this offer to influence the coming French elections. Russia added, however, that it could not provide the shipping. Our War Shipping Administration promptly sent ships to Odessa to carry the grain to France, but found no cargo ready. The Soviets hedged. They promised to provide 1,500 tons a day at Odessa and admitted that a total of 180,000 tons, not 500,000 tons, was involved. It is now calculated that, if the Soviet keeps its promise of 1,500 tons a day, only 60,000 tons will reach France this spring. This amount will not be sufficient to prevent a cut in the French bread ration, which was what the French hoped to avoid by obtaining the 500,000 tons. It remains to be seen how well the Russians will redeem their pledge.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes and Quotes

Louis Fischer, long a writer on Russian matters, and recently a severe critic of Russia's imperialism, writes in The Progressive: "I object particularly to the 'get-tough-with-Russia' policy that has apparently been adopted by Washington because I fear that it will remain congealed in this purely negative form. . . . How can America, Britain, France and Holland ask Russia to abandon imperialism when they are themselves imperialist? How can the democracies decry the sins of Soviet dictatorship when democracy is marred by economic insecurity and radical discrimination? A dozen countries are held firmly within the Russian fist. But outside of these countries many persons believe in Russia because they are unhappy. Russia, the unknown, is their paradise. If they knew Russia, they might feel differently. But the fact is that people who suffer grasp at an alternative, and the alternative is usually the enemy of him who causes the suffering. Has Secretary Byrnes understood this? He can only 'stop Russia' by building a new world, a free world, a truly democratic world, a better world in all respects than the one in which we live."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The American Friends Service Committee, launching a relief program for Germany, answers the question, "Why Do the Quakers Want the Germans to Have 2,000 Calories?" "2,000 calories daily represents an absolute minimum of food for a human being. It has been determined scientifically that the human system consumes 1,650 calories daily when lying in bed. Hence, any activity on such a low diet must result in malnutrition and eventual starvation. Prior to World War II, 2,400 calories daily was established as a minimum standard for human beings and accepted by inter-governmental agreement. The United States has maintained in international conferences that the average allowance should be 2,531 calories per person. Hence, 2,000 calories represents the lowest possible diet consistent with safety to life and health."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In the Canadian Royal Commission's investigation of the Communist fifth columnists, according to P. J. Philip writing in the New York Times, March 24, "what has stood out from the commissioners' report as the most disquieting has been the statement that 'some witnesses holding strategic positions have made the significant statement under oath that they had a loyalty which took priority over loyalty to their own country'."

In this connection, the following Lima radio broadcast on March 19 offers further evidence of this extraordinary "priority": "Rio de Janeiro -- . . . it was agreed to insert in the minutes of the Assembly the declarations of the Communist leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, to the effect that the Communist Party of Brazil would organize a resistance corps and would take up arms against the Brazilian Government if it entered any war against Russia."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Felix Morley's proposal (HUMAN EVENTS, March 20) that world citizenship could be well promoted by freedom of travel in the territories of all UNO nations would, of course, include an international interchange of students, but such a move for "closer understanding" between Russia and the Western world is again blocked both by Moscow and State Department intransigence. The Washington Evening Star, March 20, reports: "The Soviet Embassy has refused to grant visas to American veterans who want to go to Russia to take their schooling under the GI Bill of Rights, Dr. Walter C. Eells, Chief of the Foreign Training Division of the Veterans' Administration, has disclosed. Dr. Eells said Russia was the only country which was refusing admission to veterans who want to study abroad. The State Department has refused to give passports for study in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea, he added. About 20 students . . . have applied for study in Russia, Dr. Eells said."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

1323 M Street, N. W., Washington 5, D. C.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED